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LAWFUL PERSONAL USE
JESSICA LITMAN
Abstract
Whenever someone makes a copy of a copyrighted work, that copy is either authorized
by the copyright owner, permitted by some express provision of the copyright statute
(such as the ephemeral copy provision in section 112 or the fair use provision in section
107), or infringing. That's what we tell our colleagues and what we teach our students.
But most of us don't actually believe it, and this article argues that that understanding of
the copyright law is wrong.
I make this argument by examining the copyright law through the lens of personal use.
Unlike many other jurisdictions, the United States has not troubled itself to nail down the
lawfulness of personal copying and other personal uses. The statute prohibits infringement
actions “based on the noncommercial use by a consumer” of “a digital audio recording
device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog
recording medium,” but is otherwise silent on the topic of personal uses. We have been
comfortable with considerable uncertainty about the scope of lawful personal use because
enforcing copyrights against personal uses seemed, until recently, unthinkable.
Two related developments have spurred a reexamination of the lawfulness of personal
uses. First, in the last three years, record labels and motion picture studios have sued
thousands of individuals for copyright infringement. Second, the Supreme Court in the
Grokster case adopted a standard for contributory copyright liability for distributors of
technology that turns on whether the uses that the distributors encouraged their customers
to engage in are lawful or unlawful.
In this article, I argue that people's reading, listening, viewing, watching, playing and
using copyrighted works is at the core of the copyright system. I revisit copyright cases
that have attracted criticism for their stingy construction of copyright owners' property
rights, and suggest that the narrow reading of copyright rights was motivated, at least in
part, by courts' solicitude for the interests of readers and listeners. I then articulate a
definition of personal use. Armed with that definition, I look at the range of personal uses
that are uncontroversially non-infringing under current law. I focus in particular on
personal uses that seem to fall within the literal terms of copyright owners' exclusive
rights, and seem to be excused by no statutory limitation, but which are nonetheless
generally considered to be lawful. I proceed to offer an alternative test for assessing the
lawfulness of personal uses. Finally, I return to the conventional paradigm of copyright
statutory interpretation, under which all unlicensed uses are infringing unless excused. I
suggest that that rubric is not only inaccurate, but potentially destructive of copyright's
historic liberties.
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Lawful Personal Use
--Jessica Litman*

“We are perfectly fine with personal use. ”
--Mitch Bainwol, Recording Industry Association of America (2005) 1

Despite its having sued more than 18,000 of its customers,2 the recording
industry wants the world to know that it has no complaint with personal use.
Copyright lawyers of all stripes agree that copyright includes a free zone in which
individuals may make personal use of copyrighted works without legal liability.3
Unlike other nations, though, the United States hasn’t drawn the borders of its lawful
personal use zone by statute.4 Determining the circumstances under which personal
use of copyrighted works will be deemed lawful is essentially a matter of inference
and analogy, and differently striped copyright lawyers will differ vehemently on
whether a particular personal use is lawful or infringing.5
*

Professor of Law, University of Michigan. An unusually large number of people have helped me
come to grips with this topic. I owe particular thanks to Jon Weinberg, Graeme Dinwoodie, Nina
Mendelson, Jonathan Cohen and Pamela Samuelson, whose questions caused me to rethink
crucial questions and come up with different answers.
1

Future of Music Coalition 5 th Annual Policy Summit, Sept 12, 2005, at 10:53 a.m. (audio
recording on file with author), podcast online at URL: <
http://www.futureofmusic.org/events/summit05/panel04.cfm >.
2

See Jefferson Graham, RIAA Chief Says Illegal Song-Sharing “Contained,” USA Today, June
12, 2006, online at URL: http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/services/2006-06-12-riaa_x.htm.
3

Professor Marci Hamilton coined the phrase “free use zone” to describe these uses. See Marci
A. Hamilton, Impact of The Trips Agreement on Specific Disciplines: Copyrightable Literary And
Artistic Works: Article: The Trips Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 613 (1996).
4

Contrast, e.g., Canada; Norway. See, e.g., BMG Canada v. Doe [2004] F.C. 88 (Can.); Tarja
Koskinen-Olsson, The Notion of Private Copying in Nordic Legislation in the Light of European
Developments in Recent Years, 49 J. Copr. Soc’y 1003 (2002).
5

Compare, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J.
283, 300(1996) (“courts have generally declined to find personal copying as infringing”) with Jane
C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in
U.S. Copyright Law, 51 J. Copyright Soc’y USA 113 (2003)(“U.S. and international copyright law
have increasingly recognized that the author’s right to authorize, or at least be compensated for,
the making of copies, extends…to end users who make individual copies for private
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The dispute is not simply a question of where one lives on the copyright food
chain. The contours of lawful personal use are fuzzy as well as contested.6 Every
time a study of copyright law queries the scope of lawful personal use, it concludes
that the answer to the question whether any particular personal use is lawful is
indeterminate.7 Wherever the fuzzy borders of lawful personal use lie, however, most
would agree that the lawful personal use zone is shrinking.
Congress has significantly expanded the breadth of copyright protection in the
past few decades; some of that expansion has come at the expense of personal use.8
The proliferation of digital technology has made personal use both easier to track,
trace and charge for,9 and a more formidable threat to conventional commercial
exploitation of copyrights.10 Copyright owners have therefore launched a variety of
initiatives to replace unmetered and unmonitored personal uses with licensed ones.
They have demanded the restraint of unauthorized personal use as a necessary step in
encouraging the new commercial services to flourish.11 Meanwhile, individuals’
claims to make personal copies and pass them on to friends and family seem more

consumption”). See also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, T HE DIGITAL D ILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 129 (2000):
Perhaps the most contentious current copyright issue
concerns the legality of private, noncommercial copying. … The
extremes of the positions on this issue are well established and
heavily subscribed to. Some rights holders seem to believe that all,
or nearly all, unauthorized reproduction of their works, whether
private or public, commercial or noncommercial, is an
infringement. Many members of the general public appear to believe
that all or virtually all private, noncommercial copying of
copyrighted works is lawful.

6

See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment L.J. 337, 338-50 (2002).

7

See Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, study number 14, at 12, 2 Arthur Fisher
Memorial Edition at 790; Borge Varmer, Photoduplication by Libraries, Study # 15, at 51, 2
Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition at 817, Digital Dilemma, supra note 5, at 129-36. OFFICE O F
TECHNOLOGY A SSESSMENT, COPYRIGHT AND HOME COPYING: TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES THE
LAW 5-14 (1989).
8

E.g., Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727; Computer Software
Rental Amendments Act of 1990, title VIII of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, 104 Stat 5089, 5134; No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat.
2678 (1997); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887
(1998).
9

See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy v. Piracy, 9 Int’l J. Comm. L. & Policy 7 (2004-05); Jessica
Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image, 22 Dayton L. Rev. 587, 602-13
(1997).
10

See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of
an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. Copyright Soc’y of the USA 113 (2003).
11

See, e.g., American Library Association v. F.C.C., 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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questionable when those copies are digital.12 Copyright owners have insisted, with
some success, that digital devices must be equipped with copy-prevention technology
before being made available to consumers.13 Increasingly, what consumers have
viewed as a “right” to make fair uses of copyrighted works is painted as a historically
and technologically contingent privilege that may need to yield to copyright owners’
new licensing strategies.14
Fifty years ago, copyright law rarely concerned itself with uses that were not
both commercial and public.15 Twenty years ago, when the Supreme Court’s decision
in Sony v. Universal Studios16 was still fresh, people believed they were free to use
copyrighted works non-commercially, and the law for the most part backed that belief
up.17 Today, however, the recording industry has sued more than 18,000 individuals
for making personal uses that can be characterized as “commercial” only by
redefining commercial to mean “unlicensed.” Today, trading music with your friends
is called “piracy” and collecting photocopied articles relevant to your job is stealing.
Today, it’s a big deal when the lawyer representing the recording industry concedes
to the Supreme Court that it is lawful for 22 million iPod owners to use them to listen
to music they’ve copied from purchased recordings.18
Whether the shrinking of lawful personal use should disturb us depends on
whether personal use has intrinsic value. If personal use was once lawful solely
because of enforcement difficulties, the easy enforcement of copyright prerogatives
against individuals for unlicensed personal uses is yet another benefit of technological
12

See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283, 30001 (1996); The Digital Dilemma, supra note 5, at 126-45.
13

See, e.g., Universal Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436-44 (2d ir. 2001). See also Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Endangered Gizmos, at URL: http://www.eff.org/endangered/ (visited Aug.
25, 2006).
14

See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, supra note 5, at __; Jane C. Ginsburg, "the Exclusive Right to Their
Writings": Copyright and Control in the Digital Age, 54 Me L. Rev. 495 (2002); See also In re
Public Hearing on Intellectual Property Issues Involved in the National Information Infrastructure
(Nov. 18, 1993) at __ (remarks of Bruce A. Lehman, Chairman, Working Group on intellectual
Property) (suggesting that fair use may be unnecessary in an electronic environment).
15

See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT L.J.
(1994); Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J.
Intell. Prop. L. 319 (2003).
16

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).

17

See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970-71 (1992); H.R.
Rep. No. 873, part 1, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); Joel L. McKuin, Home Audio Taping Of
Copyrighted Works And The Audio Home Recording Act Of 1992: A Critical Analysis, 16
Hastings Comm/Ent 311 (1994).
18

See Transcript of Oral Argument, MGM v. Grokster, No. 04-480, March 29, 2005, URL:
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-480.pdf at 11-12.
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progress. If the only factors discouraging us from welcoming the reduction in the
scope of lawful personal use are concerns for the collateral damage to our privacy
arising from vigorous enforcement of copyright within the home, or the effects of
reduced access on social equality, we could address those fears directly by legislating
new privacy rights or encouraging the adoption of innovative pricing models.
If those suggestions fail to quell the queasiness you feel at the idea that fewer
and fewer personal uses remain lawful, then perhaps we’ve overlooked some role that
personal use plays in the copyright system. Missing such a thing would certainly be
understandable. We tend not to talk much about personal use when we’re considering
copyright reform.19 Personal users have historically found fervent advocates in
copyright law discussions only when they’re employing consumer electronic devices,
and only from the manufacturers of those devices.20 Although copyright scholarship
has wrestled with the lawfulness of personal uses since Universal Studios sued to
enjoin the Sony Betamax,21 we’ve had some difficulty coming up with useful
formulations. As copyright law has expanded to encompass more and more territory,
our vocabulary to describe the remainder has seemed to shrink as well.
Particular scholars have sought to infuse the debate with a more nuanced
analysis. Professors Julie Cohen,22 Yochai Benkler,23 Rebecca Tushnet,24 and Neil
Netanel,25 among others, have attempted to derive legal principles that protect the
interests of those who experience rather than create copyrighted works from the first
amendment.26 Professor L. Ray Patterson, among others, found users’ rights in the

19

See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Ore. L. Rev. 275,
348-53(1989).
20

JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); see Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony
v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens
21

See, e.g., Wendy Jane Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 COLUM. L. REV. __ (1982); L.
Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1 (1987)
22

Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in
Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981 (1996); Julie E Cohen. Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self
Help, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1089, 1123 (1998).
23

Yochai Benkler, The Public Domain: Through The Looking Glass: Alice And The Constitutional
Foundations Of The Public Domain, 66 Law & Contemp. Prob. 173(2003); Yochai Benkler, From
Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons
and User Access, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 561(2000); Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354
(1999).
24

Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004).
25

Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright in a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L. J. 283 (1996)

26

See also, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891
(2002); Malla Pollack, The Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting the First Amendment and
the Original Progress Clause (a.k.a. the Copyright and Patent Clause), 4 Jurimetrics 23 (2004);
Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1 (2002);
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copyright and patent clause of the constitution.27 Professors Joseph Liu and Glynn
Lunney, among others, have suggested that we find a theoretical basis for protecting
consumers within the four corners of copyright law itself.28 Both Cohen and Liu have
criticized as reductionist the common depictions of users in the copyright literature,
and have sought to refine our understanding of how the interests of users and
consumers have been under-appreciated in current copyright law and copyright legal
scholarship.29
In the summer of 2005, the unanimous Supreme Court decision in MGM v.
Grokster caused the unsettled issue of personal use to assume increased importance.30
The decision drew a line between the distributors of technology that makes
infringement easier who would be liable for their customers’ infringing use, and the
distributors of like technology who would not.31 The difference, the Court held, lay
in whether the distributors had promoted infringing or non-infringing use. To assess
likely contributory liability we need to know what personal uses are infringing. That
question is more pressing because the recording and motion picture industries, which
initially painted their suits against individuals as a last resort given the lower court
rulings in Grokster’s favor,32 have apparently found the practice of suing hundreds of
peer-to-peer file sharers each month too delicious a habit to break. The suits generate
a few thousand dollars each and may have some deterrent value. The economics of
defending them make it unlikely that individual defendants will choose to litigate.33
We therefore face the prospect that thousands of consumers will pay stiff peer-to-peer
taxes to the recording and motion picture industry each year without a meaningful
chance to establish whether they are doing something illegal.34 Nor should we feel
confident that the assault on personal use will stop at peer-to-peer file sharing. Flush
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There A Right To Have Something To Say? One View Of The
Public Domain, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 297 (2004).
27

L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example Of The Law Of Unintended Consequences, 8 J.
Intell. Prop. L. 223 (2001); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L.
Rev. 1 (1987). See also Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites To Filesharing: Personal Use In
Cyberspace, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 1129, 1134 (2001)(arguing that the policies underlying the copyright
and patent clause support the enactment of a personal use privilege).
28

See Joseph Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 Boston College Law Review 397
(2003); Glynn Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisted, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 975
(2002).
29

See Liu, supra note 28; Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L.
Rev. 347 (2005).
30

MGM v. Grokster, __ U.S. __ (2005). See Jonathan Band, So What Does Inducement Mean?,
Computer & Internet Lawyer (November 2005)
31

__ US at __.

32

See Pornography, Technology and Process: Problems and Solutions on Peer to Peer Networks,
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (Sept. 9, 2003).
33

See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 Case Western L. Rev. 917 (2005)

34

See Brief of Amici Curiae Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., and Other Law Professors in Support of
Respondents, MGM v. Grokster, No, 04-480.
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from its victory over Grokster, the recording industry changed its tune and explained
that the copyright piracy threat posed by P2P file sharing was insignificant compared
with the threat posed by unauthorized CD burning, and that the industry was rolling
out copy-protected CDs to meet the threat.35 Meanwhile, both the motion picture
industry and the recording industry seek law requiring consumer electronics
companies to incorporate copy prevention technology into digital televisions and
radios.36 Thus, the effort to capture control over personal uses is moving further and
further into consumers’ homes.37
This paper seeks to refocus the discussion of users’ and consumers’ rights
under copyright, by placing people who make personal use of copyright works at the
center of the copyright system. The view of copyright that such a reconfiguration
permits yields some useful insights. It allows us to look at 19th and 20th Century
copyright cases in a new light: Rather than viewing those opinions as decisions by
common law judges construing statutes stingily,38 we can appreciate them as
interpretations informed by a view of copyright in which readers and listeners are as
important as authors and publishers.
I propose in this paper to look at the place of readers, listeners, viewers and
the general public in copyright through the lens of personal use. After Grokster, the
topic of personal use is timely, indeed critically so. Limiting myself to personal use,
moreover, allows me to evade, for now, many of the interesting questions that arise
when readers, listeners, users and experiencers morph into publishers and
distributors.39 Finally, personal use is a realm where even the most rapacious
copyright owners have always agreed that there are some uses are lawful even
thought they are neither exempted or privileged in the copyright statute nor
recognized as legal by any judicial decision.40
35

See Mitch Bainwol, Building a Brighter Future: Making and Selling Great Music, National
Association of Recording Merchandisers Convention, Aug. 12 2005, at URL:
http://www.narm.com/2005Convention/Bainwol.pdf.
36

See ALA v. FCC, 406 F3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Broadcast and Audio Flag: Hearing Before
the Senate Commerce committee, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 24, 2006), at URL:
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/witnesslist.cfm?id=1704; EFF, Broadcast Flag,
http://www.eff.org/broadcastflag/ (visited Aug. 25, 2006).
37

See generally The Audio and Video Flags: Can Content Protection and Technological
Innoivation Coexit? Hearing Before the House Commerce Committee, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Jun
27, 2006), at URL:
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/06272006hearing1960/hearing.htm; The Analog
Hole: Can Congress Protect Copyright and Promote Innovation, Hearing Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 21, 2006), at URL:
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1956.
38

See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 980 (1990).

39

For some of my insights on those questions, see Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 37
Hastings Comm/Ent 1 (2004).
40

See Marci Hamilton, The TRIPs Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 613 (1996); infra text accompanying note 99 - 122.
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In part II of this paper, I urge that people’s reading, listening, viewing,
watching, playing and using copyrighted works is at the core of the copyright system.
In part III, I revisit copyright cases that have attracted criticism for their stingy
construction of copyright owners’ property rights, and suggest that the narrow reading
of copyright rights was motivated, at least in part, by courts’ solicitude for the
interests of readers and listeners. These courts sought to evaluate whether accused
uses were more akin to reading and listing than to publishing and distributing, and
they examined the potential impact of their decisions on readers and listeners as welll
as authors and publishers. When a broad literal reading of statutory language would
have significantly burdened reading, listening and viewing, these courts resisted that
interpretation of the statute. In part IV, I articulate a definition of personal use.
Armed with that definition, in part V, I look at the range of personal uses that are
uncontroversially non-infringing under current law. I focus in particular on personal
uses that seem to fall within the literal terms of copyright owners’ exclusive rights,
and seem to be excused by no statutory limitation, but which are nonetheless
generally considered to be lawful. I proceed in section VI to offer an alternative test
for assessing the lawfulness of personal uses. Finally, in section VII, I return to the
conventional paradigm of copyright statutory interpretation, under which all
unlicensed uses are infringing unless excused. I suggest that that rubric is not only
inaccurate, but potentially destructive of copyright’s historic liberties.
II.

What is copyright law for?
The copyright law … makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration.
--United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948 )

We sometimes talk and write about copyright law as if encouraging the creation
and dissemination of works of authorship were the ultimate goal, with nothing further
required to “promote the Progress of Science.”41 We have focused so narrowly on
the production half of the copyright equation that we have seemed to think that the
“Progress of Science” is nothing more than a giant warehouse filled with works of
authorship. When we do this, we miss or forget an essential step. In order for the
creation and dissemination of a work of authorship to mean anything at all, someone
needs to read the book, view the art, hear the music, watch the film, listen to the CD,
run the computer program, build and inhabit the architecture.
This insight seems so obvious that it is surprising that it shows up so rarely in
the copyright laws, the legislative efforts to enact them, or the scholarship that
critiques them. The copyright interests of the readers, viewers, listeners, watchers,
builders and inhabitants may get short shrift in Congressional hearings because they
have so few paid representatives beyond members of Congress themselves. Their
41

Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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absence until very recently from copyright scholarship is more difficult to account
for. The notion that copyright law’s primary purpose is to benefit the public has been
commonplace for many years.42 The understanding that its mechanism was to enable
works of authorship to enrich the people who read, listened to, and viewed them has
appeared in many copyright cases.43 Yet copyright scholarship’s recent
preoccupation with law and economics has translated those pronouncements into
assertions that the public will benefit when authors and distributors have robust
incentives to create and market works.44 So long as people buy books and CDs, who
cares if they read or listen to them? Outlier scholars have published books and articles
seeking to argue that copyright law, properly understood, places readers, listeners and
viewers at its center.45 Those arguments, though, have for the most part been poorly
received even by copyright skeptics, who have viewed them as extreme.46
Copyright law is intended to create a legal ecology that encourages the creation
and dissemination of works of authorship, and thereby “promote the Progress of
Science.” As James Boyle has reminded us, ecologies are complex and
interdependent systems.47 If we build shopping centers and housing tracts on all of the
marshes and frog ponds, we will eventually find ourselves overrun with mosquitoes.
In the same way, laws that discourage book reading end up being bad for book
authors. Thus, it isn’t difficult to frame an argument that copyright law cannot
properly encourage authors to create new works if it imposes undue burdens on
readers. Such arguments are more palatable to fans of strong copyright than
arguments urging the primacy of reading, and much of the scholarship urging limited
copyright, my own included,48 has relied on them.49 Those arguments, though, have
42

See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT 3-9 (1989); ROBERT GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 1
(1991).
43

See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); USA v. Paramount Pictures, 334 US 131
(1948).
44

See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 79-80 (2001).

45

See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW
RIGHTS (1991); Glynn Lunney, supra note 28; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative
Destruction of Copyright, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (2002).
OF U SERS’
46

See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 29, at __. Copyright true believers have been even less receptive.
For a strident and not entirely coherent argument that users have and should have no rights
whatsoever under copyright laws, see David R. Johnstone, Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copy
Duty Under US Copyright Law, 52 J. Copyright Soc’y USA 345, 357-58 (2005)(“ No "Users'
Rights" Exist (Explicitly or Implicitly)”).
47

James Boyle had the insight that intellectual property laws created an information ecology. See
James Boyle, An Environmentalism for the Net, 47 Duke L. Rev. 87 (1997); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 33 (2003); Symposium: Cultural
Environmentalism @ 10, L. & Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming 2006).
48

See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 1018-19 (1990).

49

See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’ S
PARADOX (forthcoming 2007); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, 66 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 44-49 (2003).
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been vulnerable to the assertion that if strong copyright laws prove unfavorable to
authors because of the burdens they impose on readers, authors can always exercise
their options to waive some of their rights, or license them on easy and generous
terms.50 Recent rejoinders have focused on the difficulties attending licensing.51 I
want to resist the temptation to advance an argument that personal use requires
protection for the sake of authors. Rather, I want to insist that copyright law
encourages authorship at least as much for the benefit of the people who will read,
view, listen to and experience the works that authors create, as for the advantage of
those authors and their distributors.
For most of the history of copyright, the law left reading, listening, and viewing
unconstrained. The copyright statutes on the books neither mentioned personal uses
expressly, nor needed to. The exclusive rights granted by copyright were narrow, and
the law aimed its proscriptions at commercial and institutional entities. Thus the
opportunities of members of the public to engage in unfettered reading, listening to,
and looking at works protected by copyright received little explicit attention. They
nonetheless functioned as historic copyright liberties,52 implicit in the copyright
statutory scheme and essential to its purpose. Where copyright claims posed serious
threats to these liberties, courts often responded by reading the scope of copyright’s
exclusive rights narrowly.

III.

Revisiting older cases
[T]he copyright statute accords the proprietor of a
copyright a number of exclusive rights. But unlike
the patentee, the copyright owner does not enjoy the
exclusive right to “ use ” his copyrighted work. ”
---Alan Latman, 1955 53

U.S. copyright law initially limited itself to securing the author’s right to
“print, reprint, publish or vend.”54 In 1856, Congress added a public performance
right, limited to dramatic compositions. In 1870, it added dramatization and
50

See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 Nova S.E.Univ. L. Rev.
657, 697 (1999).
51

See Lessig, supra note 49, at __; Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights,
53 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 673 (2003); Katie Dean, Copyright Reform to Free Orphans,
WIRED News, April 12, 2005.
52

See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency,
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 Stanford L. Rev. 1343 (1989).
53

Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, study number 14, at 5, 2 Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition at
783.
54

An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
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translation rights. In 1897, it extended the public performance right to musical
compositions. The standard account of 19th and early 20th century copyright in the
United States tells us that Congress defined the scope of the copyright grant
narrowly and courts construed it stingily.55 Looking back at early copyright law
from the vantage point of the 21st century, when copyright rights are broad, deep
and very long,56 the scope of early copyright laws can seem startlingly
constrained. Focusing on the relative narrowness of early copyright’s excusive
rights, though, can obscure some of the reasons informing courts’ interpretations.
The language of some of the most notorious decisions limiting the scope of
copyright advanced the interests of readers, listeners and viewers. Courts
confronting novel claims of infringement sought to locate the allegedly infringing
behavior on the continuum between exploitation and enjoyment, in order to
preserve copyright owners’ control over exploitation while denying them control
over individual reading, listening, playing and viewing.57
In Stowe v. Thomas,58 for example, Harriet Beecher Stowe sued to enjoin
the publication of an unauthorized German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and
lost. The court held that her copyright in the book did not extend so far:
An author may be said to be the creator or inventor, both
of the ideas contained in his book, and the combination of words
to represent them. Before publication he has the exclusive
possession of his invention. His dominion is perfect. But when
he has published his book, and given his thoughts, sentiments,
knowledge or discoveries to the world, he can have no longer an
exclusive possession of them. Such an appropriation becomes
impossible, and is inconsistent with the object of publication.
The author's conceptions have become the common property of
his readers, who cannot be deprived of the use of them, nor of
their right to communicate them to another clothed in their own
language, by lecture or by treatise.59

Eaton Drone’s 1879 copyright treatise described the decision in Stowe v. Thomas
as “clearly wrong, unjust and absurd,”60 and it has long been traditional to cite the

55

See ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVID, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 32627 (2000); Netanel, supra note 49, at __; Edward Samuels, The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in
Copyright Law, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 321, 325-47 (1989).
56

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2002).

57

The late Ray Patterson, in an important article published two decades ago, articulated this
distinction as the difference between using the copyright and using the work. See L. Ray
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 Vanderbilt. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1987).
58

23 F. Cas. 201 (1853)

59

Id. at 206

60

EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS
454n.4 (1879)
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case as an example of the extraordinary stinginess of 19th century US copyright.61
What we miss, though, when we look only at how narrowly the court construed
the author’s rights, is its focus on the rights of readers. The court struck a
balance between authors’ property interests and readers’ “common property”
interests, in which the author’s exclusive right yielded to her readers’ right to
communicate the author’s conception. The translator and publisher of the
German edition were, in this analysis, simply readers of Stowe’s book, exercising
the liberties that copyright law afforded them.
A century later, in a pair of copyright cases challenging cable television
system’s unlicensed transmission of broadcast signals, the Supreme Court held
that the cable operators were not performing the signals they transmitted within
the meaning of the statute, but should be deemed akin to viewers.62 Similarly,
when composers sued the owner of a small Pittsburgh restaurant who entertained
his customers by playing radio programs in the dining area, the Court held that the
restaurant could not be held liable for publicly performing the music for profit.
What it was doing when it played the radio for its customers, the Court insisted,
was not performing, but listening.63 The Court predicated its construction of the
61

See, e.g., Litman, supra note 38, at 979; Hannibal Travis, Pirates of the Information
infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 777, 824
(2000); Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1213, 1233-34
(1997).
62

In Fortnightly v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968), a motion picture studio that
had licensed its programming to television for broadcast sued the operator of cable television
systems that had, without a license, transmitted the programming to customers in nearby areas
who had poor television reception because of the hilly terrain. The studio claimed that Fortnightly
was performing its motion pictures for profit. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court
continued:
Essentially, a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's capacity to
receive the broadcaster's signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an
efficient connection to the viewer's television set. It is true that a CATV
system plays an "active" role in making reception possible in a given area, but
so do ordinary television sets and antennas. CATV equipment is powerful and
sophisticated, but the basic function the equipment serves is little different from
that served by the equipment generally furnished by a television viewer. If an
individual erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed
the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be "performing" the
programs he received on his television set. The result would be no different if
several people combined to erect a cooperative antenna for the same purpose.
The only difference in the case of CATV is that the antenna system is erected
and owned not by its users but by an entrepreneur.

Id. at 399. Six years later, the Court was invited to reexamine the line between broadcaster and
viewer in a copyright infringement case against a cable television company that imported
television broadcast signals from geographically remote areas. See Teleprompter v. CBS, 415
U.S. 394 (1974). The Court refused to find copyright liability.
63

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 160-61, 163-64 (1975): .
To hold in this case that the respondent Aiken "performed" the petitioners'
copyrighted works would … result in a regime of copyright law that would be both
wholly unenforceable and highly inequitable.
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public performance right in part on its concern for the restaurant owner’s interest
in listening to the radio.
None of these cases targeted individual personal users directly;64 all were
suits against intermediaries who facilitated reading, listening and viewing. The
courts resolved them in defendants’ favor, though, by treating the intermediaries’
activities as on the readers’ listeners’ or viewers’ side of the line between
copyright owner exploitation and reader, listener or viewer enjoyment of
copyrighted works. In other cases, courts explicitly addressed the intermediaries’
role, but considered the potential impact of prohibiting the use on reader, listener
or viewer liberties as an important and possibly determinative consideration.

The practical unenforceability of a ruling that all of those in Aiken's position are
copyright infringers is self-evident. One has only to consider the countless business
establishments in this country with radio or television sets on their premises -- bars,
beauty shops, cafeterias, car washes, dentists' offices, and drive-ins -- to realize the total
futility of any evenhanded effort on the part of copyright holders to license even a
substantial percentage of them.
And a ruling that a radio listener "performs" every broadcast that he receives would
be highly inequitable for two distinct reasons. First, a person in Aiken's position would
have no sure way of protecting himself from liability for copyright infringement except
by keeping his radio set turned off. For even if he secured a license from ASCAP, he
would have no way of either foreseeing or controlling the broadcast of compositions
whose copyright was held by someone else. Secondly, to hold that all in Aiken's position
"performed" these musical compositions would be to authorize the sale of an untold
number of licenses for what is basically a single public rendition of a copyrighted work.
The exaction of such multiple tribute would go far beyond what is required for the
economic protection of copyright owners, and would be wholly at odds with the balanced
congressional purpose behind 17 U.S.C. § 1(e):
"The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection
accorded to music has been to give to the composer an adequate
return for the value of his composition, and it has been a serious and
a difficult task to combine the protection of the composer with the
protection of the public, and to so frame an act that it would
accomplish the double purpose of securing to the composer an
adequate return for all use made of his composition and at the same
time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies, which might
be founded upon the very rights granted to the composer for the
purpose of protecting his interests." H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong.,
2d Sess. , 7 (1909).

Id. at 163-64.
64

Until the recent flood of peer-to-peer file sharing lawsuits, copyright infringement suits against
individuals were so rare as to be almost unthinkable. When Universal Studios included a nominal
claim against individual Betamax owner William Griffiths in its 1976 lawsuit against Sony, that
fact inspired a host of editorial cartoons, despite the fact that Mr. Griffiths was a client of the firm
representing Universal and had consented to be sued. See James Lardner, Fast Forward 17-19
(2002).
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Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States65 has the distinction of having
been dubbed the “Dred Scott” case of copyright law.66 Williams & Wilkins, a
publisher of 37 medical journals, sued the National Library of Medicine, claiming
that photocopying journal articles to meet requests for interlibrary loans infringed
its copyrights. The Court of Claims held the photocopying to be fair use. The
court began its analysis with the observation that the statutory right to “’copy’ is
not to be taken in its full literal sweep.”
The court-created doctrine of "fair use" … is alone enough to
demonstrate that Section 1 does not cover all copying (in the literal
sense). Some forms of copying, at the very least of portions of a work,
are universally deemed immune from liability, although the very words
are reproduced in more than de minimis quantity. Furthermore, it is
almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a handwritten
copy of an entire copyrighted article for his own use….67

Judge Davis’s opinion relied on “years of accepted practice” of copying entire
poems, songs, illustrations, articles, and judicial opinions for personal use to
support the proposition that copyright law permits unlicensed copying in a host of
situations,68 and then focused on the burden to individual medical researchers of
deeming the Library’s copying to be infringing:
If photocopying were forbidden, the researchers, instead of subscribing
to more journals or trying to obtain or buy back-issues or reprints
(usually unavailable), might expend extra time in note-taking or waiting
their turn for the library's copies of the original issues -- or they might
very well cut down their reading and do without much of the information
they now get through NLM's and NIH's copying system. The record
shows that each of the individual requesters in this case already
subscribed, personally, to a number of medical journals, and it is very
questionable how many more, if any, they would add. The great
problems with reprints and back-issues have already been noted. In the
absence of photocopying, the financial, timewasting, and other
difficulties of obtaining the material could well lead, if human
experience is a guide, to a simple but drastic reduction in the use of the
many articles (now sought and read) which are not absolutely crucial to
the individual's work but are merely stimulating or helpful. The probable
effect on scientific progress goes without saying….69

65

487 F.2d 1345 (1973)., aff’d by an equally divided court, U.S. .

66

See 487 F. 2d at 1387 (Nichols, J. dissenting) (“We are making the Dred Scott decision of
copyright law.”); Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, Universal City
Studios v. Sony, (“Williams & Wilkins Co., which has been appropriately regarded as the "Dred
Scott decision of copyright law” … is clearly not binding in this circuit, and, in any event, we find
its underlying rationale singularly unpersuasive.”); rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)..
67

Id. at 1350.

68

Id. at 1353.

69

Id. at 1358.
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In the aggregate, the Library’s photocopying was massive. The court nonetheless
concluded it was non-infringing because of the personal use interests of each of
the many individual researchers for whom the copies were made.
In Sony v. Universal Studios,70 copyright owners sued the producer of the
videocassette recorder, claiming that it should be liable for the massive copyright
infringement of the millions of consumers who used its VCR to record broadcast
programming off the air. The Supreme Court held that recording a program to
enable its later viewing, while technically an unauthorized copy, was fair use and
therefore not actionable.71 “One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any
sign that the elected representatives of the millions of people who watch
television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at
home…”72
Other opinions famous for their stingy constructions of copyright owners’
control also advanced the interests of readers, listeners and viewers. White Smith
v. Apollo,73 for example, stands in the copyright lexicon for the illogical
narrowness of the copyright law of its era.74 In White-Smith, a music publisher
sued to enjoin the manufacture of piano rolls designed to cause piano rolls to play
songs protected by the publisher’s copyright. The Court held that piano rolls were
not “copies” within the meaning of the statute, and that they therefore did not
infringe: “When the combination of musical sounds is reproduced to the ear it is
the original tune as conceived by the author which is heard. These musical tones
are not a copy which appeals to the eye. In no sense can musical sounds which
reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be copies as that term is generally
understood.”75 The effect of White-Smith was to allow non-musicians who would
70

464 U.S. 417 (1984).

71

Id. at . See Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony, Mary Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in
JANE C. GINSBURG AND ROCHELLE COOPER D REYFUSS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES
(2005).
72

464 U.S. at 456. The interests of television viewer had more influence on the result in Sony than
the ultimate opinion reveals. Justice Stevens who authored the majority opinion, focused
primarily on the rights of homeowners using VCRs from the first Supreme Court deliberations on
the case. Indeed, an early draft of the majority opinion characterized the lawsuit as an effort to
“control the way William Griffiths watches television…”
73

209 U.S. 1 (1908).

74

See, e.g., Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: The Court, Media Neutrality and New
Technologies, 12 J. Intell. Prop. L. 427, 427 (2005);Craig Joyce et. al., Copyright Law 70, 76 (6th
Ed. 2003). For a different analysis that seeks to rehabilitate the White-Smith v. Apollo opinion, see
Kenneth M. Alfano, Copyright in Exile: Restoring the Original Parameters of Exclusive
Reproduction (manuscript on file with author).
75

209 U.S. at 17:
It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument which reproduces
a tune copies it; but this is a strained and artificial meaning. When the
combination of musical sounds is reproduced to the ear it is the original tune as
conceived by the author which is heard. These musical tones are not a copy
which appeals to the eye. In no sense can musical sounds which reach us
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otherwise have been unable to play the copyrighted songs to enjoy listening to
them in their homes.
Looked at from the vantage point of a copyright owner seeking
enforcement of its rights, these opinions have seemed unreasonably conservative,
and have been criticized accordingly.76 Viewed from the perspective of readers,
listeners, and viewers, though, the decisions vindicate their continuing importance
in the copyright formula. Stowe v. Thomas recognized the rights of Stowe’s
readers; White-Smith v. Apollo and George Aiken advanced the interests of
listeners; Sony and the cable television cases upheld the rights of viewers.
Williams & Wilkins suggested that copyright law has always excused strictly
personal copying. If copyright law is designed to encourage reading, viewing,
listening and experiencing works of authorship as well as creating and distributing
them, then courts’ reluctance to read the copyright grant too expansively can be
seen as an effort to preserve that equilibrium.77 Cases that are conventionally
painted as the most notorious examples of courts’ crabbed construction of
copyright may be more usefully understood as defenses of the central place of
readers, listeners and players in the copyright scheme.
More recently, some courts have given copyright a similarly constrained
reading in cases involving computer technology. In Nintendo of America v. Lewis
Galoob Toys,78 Nintendo sued the maker of the Game Genie, which allowed
consumers to modify the way a Nintendo game played. Nintendo argued that the
Game Genie caused consumers to create unauthorized derivative works by
varying the Nintendo games’ audiovisual display. The trial court noted that “The
alleged infringer in this case is not a commercial licensee, but rather a consumer
through the sense of hearing be said to be copies as that term is generally
understood, and as we believe it was intended to be understood in the statutes
under consideration. A musical composition is an intellectual creation which
first exists in the mind of the composer; he may play it for the first time upon
an instrument. It is not susceptible of being copied until it has been put in a
form which other can see and read. The statute has not provided for the
protection of the intellectual conception apart from the thing produced,
however meritorious such conception may be, but has provided for the making
and filing of a tangible thing, against the publication and duplication of which it
is the purpose of the statute to protect the composer.

Id. at 17. See also Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (D.C. Ct. App. 1901) (phonograph records
not “copies”).
76

See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, "the Exclusive Right to Their Writings": Copyright and Control in
the Digital Age, 54 Me. L. Rev. 495 (2002).
77

To put this another way, courts seem to have interpreted the scope of copyright rights in light of
a conviction that Congress had carefully weighed the rights of readers and listeners against the
rights of authors and publishers to arrive at the appropriate, carefully calibrated balance, and that
Congress did not and would not have abridged the rights of readers and listeners significantly
without saying so in a clear, ringing voice.
78

780 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).

15
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art62

16

Litman:

Jessica Litman

8/25/06

Draft

utilizing the Game Genie for noncommercial, private enjoyment. Such use neither
generates a fixed transferable copy of the work, nor exhibits or performs the work
for commercial gain.” The consumer, the court concluded, did not infringe
Nintendo’s copyright by using a Game Genie to alter the game play of Nintendo
games:
Both parties agree that it is acceptable, under the copyright laws,
for a noncopyright holder to publish a book of instructions on how to
modify the rules and/or method of play of a copyrighted game. Once
having purchased, for example, a copyrighted board game, a consumer is
free to take the board home and modify the game in any way the
consumer chooses, whether or not the method used comports with the
copyright holder's intent. The copyright holder, having received expected
value, has no further control over the consumer's private enjoyment of
that game.
Because of the technology involved, owners of video games are
less able to experiment with or change the method of play, absent an
electronic accessory such as the Game Genie. This should not mean that
holders of copyrighted video games are entitled to broader protections or
monopoly rights than holders of other types of copyrighted games,
simply because a more sophisticated technology is involved. Having paid
Nintendo a fair return, the consumer may experiment with the product
and create new variations of play, for personal enjoyment, without
creating a derivative work.79

It followed that Galoob did not infringe by selling the device that enabled the
consumers’ use. The Court of Appeals affirmed.80 Neither the trial court nor the
Court of Appeals were able to ground their interpretation in the literal language of
section 106(2) of the copyright statute; instead, they gave the language a
narrowing gloss because they were persuaded of the importance of the
consumers’ interest in playing games they had purchased in the ways they desired
to.
In Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland International,81 Lotus sued
Borland for copying the words and arrangement of the menu command hierarchy
of the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program, which Lotus insisted embodied the
program’s “look and feel.” The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded
that whether or not the menu command hierarchy resulted from expressive
choices, it was uncopyrightable as a “method of operation” under section 102(b)
of the copyright statute.82 Judge Boudin, concurring, expressed some discomfort
79

780 F. Supp. at 1291.

80

954 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).

81

49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).

82

17 U.S.C. § 102(b):
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
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with the majority’s rationale. In his view, the interests of Lotus’s customers, who
had invested time learning Lotus’s commands and devising their own macros
required a judgment for Borland. The difficulty was finding an appropriate
rationale to support it:
If Lotus is granted a monopoly on this pattern, users who have
learned the command structure of Lotus 1-2-3 or devised their own
macros are locked into Lotus, just as a typist who has learned the
QWERTY keyboard would be the captive of anyone who had a
monopoly on the production of such a keyboard. Apparently, for a period
Lotus 1-2-3 has had such sway in the market that it has represented the
de facto standard for electronic spreadsheet commands. So long as Lotus
is the superior spreadsheet--either in quality or in price--there may be
nothing wrong with this advantage.
But if a better spreadsheet comes along, it is hard to see why
customers who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it
should remain captives of Lotus because of an investment in learning
made by the users and not by Lotus. Lotus has already reaped a
substantial reward for being first; assuming that the Borland program is
now better, good reasons exist for freeing it to attract old Lotus
customers: to enable the old customers to take advantage of a new
advance, and to reward Borland in turn for making a better product. If
Borland has not made a better product, then customers will remain with
Lotus anyway.
Thus, for me the question is not whether Borland should prevail
but on what basis.83

In Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia
Systems,84 the recording industry brought suit to enjoin the sale of the first
portable MP3 player under the Audio Home Recording Act. The recording
industry argued that, in return for shielding consumers from liability for
noncommercial copying of recorded music, the law required digital audio
recording devices to incorporate copy-protection technology and pay copyright
royalties to compensate rights holders for the presumed copies made by
individuals. Since Diamond neither paid the statutory royalties nor included serial
copy management technology in the device’s design, the RIAA argued, its
manufacture and sale of the device was illegal. The court of appeals for the 9th
Circuit ruled that portable MP3 players were not subject to the copy-protection
and royalty payment requirements of the Audio Home Recording Act. Moreover,
it continued:
The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or "spaceshift," those files that already reside on a user's hard drive. …Such
copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent
with the purposes of the Act.85
83

49 F.2d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring).

84

189 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979).

85

Id. at 1072 (citing Sony v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984)).
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The court’s language reflects a conviction that noncommercial personal use was
lawful, and that marketing devices that facilitated it, therefore, could not engender
liability.
The line of authority reading copyright rights narrowly to preserve the
liberties of readers, listeners or viewers is by no means undisputed. For every
case in which a copyright defendant persuaded a court to read statutory exclusive
rights narrowly, there is at least one in which the court mechanically applied the
literal language of the statute to find infringement without much attention to the
effects of the ruling on readers, listeners or viewers.86 In A&M Records v.
Napster, for example, defendant sought to rely on Sony and RIAA v. Diamond to
argue that users of its software engaged in lawful personal copying.87 The Court
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit found that argument too hard to swallow. Judge
Beezer’s opinion rejected Napster’s argument that downloading music from other
individuals might be excused either by the Audio Home Recording Act or by the
fair use doctrine. Indeed, appalled by the vast scale, in the aggregate, of millions
of individuals’ copying music from each other’s hard drives, Judge Beezer
declared the consumer copying to be commercial.88 In Grokster, the Supreme
Court predicated its opinion on the assumption – uncontested by defendants –
that the vast majority of consumer file sharing over peer-to-peer networks was
blatantly illegal.89 Not all courts consider the impact of their rulings on personal
uses, and not all personal uses strike courts as legitimate. The strongest inference
the case law supports is that reader, listener and viewer interests have influenced
many courts’ reading of the scope of copyright, and that that influence dates back
to the earliest copyright cases.
At least some courts, then, have long treated reading, listening, viewing
and using as essential copyright liberties. When copyright owners’ claims have
trod on them too heavily, courts have read copyright’s exclusive rights narrowly
to preserve those liberties from copyright-owner control. Reading, listening,
viewing, and their modern cousins watching, playing, running, and building, are
central to the copyright scheme. We knew that once, but forgot it sometime
within the past generation as the rhetoric of copyright increasingly characterized
personal uses as piracy and theft. If we think about personal use as a guilty
pleasure that is probably morally wrong, we’re going to lose it. If we recall that
encouraging personal use is an objective that’s crucial to the copyright system, we
may find the will to defend it against increasingly forceful encroachment.
86

See, e.g, MAI v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Red Baron-Franklin Park v.
Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275(4th Cir.); Worlds of Wonder v. Veritel Learning Systems, 658 F. Supp.
351 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
87

239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

88

Id. at 1015 (“Direct economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a commercial use. Rather,
repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered for sale,
may constitute a commercial use.”).
89

MGM v. Grokster, __ U.S. at __.
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What is “personal use?”
“It would plainly be unconstitutional to prohibit a person
from singing a copyrighted song in the shower or jotting
down a copyrighted poem he hears on the radio.”
--Justice John Paul Stevens, 1983 90

In order to sidestep extant debates about what counts as “private use,”
“noncommercial use,” or “use by a consumer,” in which advocates for various
results have taken hardened positions,91 I’d like to avoid previously contested
vocabulary. I want to start with a definition of “personal use.” I offer the
definition on the assumption that some subset of personal use will be lawful, some
subset will be infringing, and that the legality of some personal uses will be
controversial. With that disclaimer, I propose to define “personal use” as a use
that an individual makes for herself, her family, or her close friends.92 So defined,
personal use can take place at home or at work, on the street or in the store. It
may happen with or without a commercial purpose. It may or may not compete
with copyright owners’ planned exploitation of their works. It may occur within a
statutory exemption. It may be either permitted or prohibited by a license.
Figuring out which personal uses are lawful and which are not will give us a
chance to examine the place of personal use in the copyright scheme.
In the spirit of rhetorical experiment, and as part of my strategy for
sidestepping existing controversies, I propose to refer to the individuals who make

90

1st draft, Memorandum of Justice Stevens, Sony v. Universal Studios (No.81-1687) (circulated
June 13, 1983), at 17-18. See Jessica Litman. The Sony Paradox, 55 Case Western L. Rev. 917,
930-34 (2005).
91

See Music on the Internet: Is There an Up Side to Downloading?: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. On the Judiciary, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 11, 2000) at URL:
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=195; MusicUnited.org, The Law, URL:
<http://www.musicunited.org/2_thelaw.html> (visited August 13, 2006); University of Georgia,
Regents’ Guide to Understanding Copyright and Fair Use, URL:
http://www.usg.edu/legal/copyright/#part3d3b (visited August 13, 2006); Lutheran-Hymnal.com,
Permission and Copyright and URL: http://www.lutheranhymnal.com/about_us/permision_and_copyright.html (visited August 13, 2006).
92

For a somewhat broader definition see Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites To Filesharing:
Personal Use In Cyberspace, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 1129, 1134 (2001) (“ ‘Personal use,’ in the broad
sense, means consumption or adaptation of intellectual properties by individual users for their own
purposes, including uncompensated sharing of those works with others.”) For a narrower
definition see Lutheran Hymnal Online, Permission and Copyright URL: http://www.lutheranhymnal.com/about_us/permision_and_copyright.html (visited August 13, 2006) (“Personal private
use is that which occurs  w ithin you [sic] immediate biological family”).
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personal use as “persons,” “people,” or “individuals” rather than “consumers,”93
“users,”94 or “fans.”95
V.

What personal uses are lawful?
“ anyone may copy copyrighted materials for the
purpose of private study and review ”
--Saul Cohen, 1955 96

With a definition of personal use to work with, we can start to map out which
personal uses are lawful and which infringe. A standard paradigm for construing
the copyright law holds that any unlicensed use that falls within the literal terms
of section 106, which gives copyright owners control over fixed reproductions,
adaptations, distributions to the public, public performance and public displays,97
violates the copyright law unless it comes within the terms of an express statutory
exemption.98 As I will explore in detail below, I believe that rubric is at best
misleading, but it will give us a place to begin. Even if the standard paradigm
accurately describes the law, there is a large class of personal uses that are simply
outside of the scope of the current copyright statute. That zone, smaller than it
used to be, includes all private performances and displays.99 It includes all private
distributions, since the copyright owner’s distribution right is limited to
distributions “to the public.”100 Copyright owners have no copyright rights that
would allow them to control private performances, displays and distributions.
Nor have copyright owners any right to prohibit people from making unfixed
reproductions of copyrighted works.101
93

See, e.g., Liu, supra note 28.

94

See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 29.

95

See, e.g., Fred Von Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers A Good Idea, Law.com (Sept. 29,
2004), at URL: <http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1095434496352>. See also Justin
Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 Tex. L. Rev.
923(1999)(“non-owners”).
96

Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 C OPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 43, 58 (1955).

97

17 U.S.C. § 106.

98

See, e.g., MusicUnited.org, The Law, URL: http://www.musicunited.org/2_thelaw.html (visited
August 13, 2006); Brad Templeton, 10 Myths About Copyright Explained, URL:
http://www.templetons.com/brad/copymyths.html (October 2004).
99

17 U.S.C. § 106(4), 106(5)

100

17 U.S.C. § 106(3): “to distribute copies or phonorecords to the work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership or by rental lease or lending.” This limitation has attracted almost no
attention in the 30 years since the enactment of the 1976 Act, presumably because few
unauthorized private distributions of copies or phonorecords have attracted litigation.
101

17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(1)
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A number of other personal uses are permitted because of statutory
exemptions and privileges. The first sale doctrine in section 109 allows
distribution and display to the public of owned, lawfully made copies and
phonorecords. Section 109(e) permits the public performance of video games on
coin-operated machines. Section 110(5) allows people to listen to and watch
radio and television broadcasts in public places, so long as they use the sort of
equipment commonly found in private homes. Section 110(11) allows private
households to use software to hide objectionable scenes in motion pictures they
are viewing.102 Section 117 permits people to modify and make backup copies of
the computer programs on their computers. Section 120 allows homeowners to
renovate and photograph their homes, notwithstanding the architects’
reproduction and adaptation rights. Section 602 permits people to import copies
or phonorecords of copyrighted works for use (as distinguished from sale) as part
of their personal luggage. Section 1008 prohibits copyright infringement suits
against consumers who make noncommercial copies of recorded music (at least
so long as they use analog or digital audio recording devices or media.)
In addition, the statute includes specific exemptions for intermediaries to
reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform or display works for the benefit of people
making exempt personal uses. Section 110(11) allows software companies to
create and market programs designed to assist individuals who wish to censor
offensive scenes in motion picture broadcasts or DVDs. Section 111 allows the
proprietors of hotels and apartment buildings to transmit broadcast programs to
individual apartments and hotel rooms so that the occupants can perform them
privately. Section 117 permits computer repair services authorized by people who
own computers to run the copyrighted computer programs installed on
individuals’ machines as part of the repair process. Section 121 allows non-profit
groups to reproduce copyrighted books and magazines in a format that allows
blind and disabled people to read or listen to them.
Finally, some personal uses that qualify for no express statutory exemption
have been held to be privileged by courts. Sony v. Universal Studios classified
home video-recording of broadcast television signals for time shifting purposes as
fair use, and the manufacturer and sale of devices to accomplish it as noninfringing.103 Recording Industry Association v. Diamond Multimedia held that
the consumer copying of digital music recordings to a portable MP3 player was
non-infringing personal use,104 and that the manufacture and sale of devices to
facilitate it was not actionable.
102

Family Movie Act of 2005, Public L. No. 109-9, title II (2005), codified at 17 U.S.C. §
110(11).
103

464 U.S. 417 (1984).

104

RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F. 3d 1072, 1079 (1999). The court’s basis for this
conclusion is ambiguous. It isn’t clear whether the court intended to hold that such copying came
within the shelter of 17 USC § 1008 or was excused on some other ground, such as fair use. See
A&M v. Napster, (9th Cir. 2001). In a recent Copyright Office filing, a coalition of copyright
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Before moving into more controversial territory, let’s pause for reflection. All
of us make personal uses of copyrighted works that don’t seem to fall within any
of the exclusions I outlined above.105 I back up my hard disk every week, even
though I know that I am making archival copies of material that is not a computer
program and therefore is not within the scope of the privilege in section 117.
Indeed, chastened by the repeated meltdown of a shiny new iMac G5 two years
ago, I back it up to three different locations. My son collects comic books and
manga, and practices drawing manga characters that look as much as possible like
the drawings he uses as models. My husband has purchased two computer
programs that allow him to record, scan, manipulate, transpose, revise and
generate sheet music or audio files for musical compositions. He uses them on
songs from Broadway musicals to create versions easy for our son to sing. My
sister’s family has a Tivo. They like it so much that they bought one as a birthday
present for our mother. My friend Ann cannot be discouraged from forwarding
me email messages that she thinks I’ll enjoy. My neighbor across the street has
triplets to whom she frequently reads aloud. Because of her firm ideas about
what’s appropriate literature for her children, she commonly edits language,
gender and important plot points as she reads, on the fly. My neighbors down the
block are college students who party loudly on summer weekends, playing their
CDs through powerful speakers; if they open their windows, their sound of music
reaches the entire neighborhood.
The conventional analysis would tell us that when those uses involve a fixed
reproduction, an adaptation, or a public distribution, performance or display, then
they infringe copyright unless they are excused by the fair use privilege codified
in section 107. My hard disk backups, my son’s drawing, my mother’s TiVo and
and my friend’s email messages all involve unauthorized fixed reproduction. My
neighbor’s reading aloud generates unauthorized adaptations. My husband’s
software permits him to do both. My neighbors down the block are engaged in
unauthorized public performance. If the conventional analysis is right, then
either our uses are fair under the multi-factor statutory test, or we are routinely
breaking the law.
The tools we have developed to evaluate a claim of fair use, though, seem illfitted to assess the lawfulness of these or other common personal uses. The
statute, as interpreted by the courts, would have us ask whether the purpose of use
owners insisted that such copying was lawful only to the extent that copyright owners had
implicitly authorized it. See U.S. Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention
of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control technologies, Docket Number RM 2005-11,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/11metalitz_AAP.pdf (filed Feb. 2, 2006), at 22-23 &
n.46.
105

See Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001).
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is commercial or noncommercial, whether it is transformative or duplicative,
whether the work we are using is primarily factual or occupies the core of
protected copyrightable expression, whether we use a only a small part of the
work or a large part, or even the entire thing, and whether our uses threaten to
substitute for authorized, licensed uses in the marketplace.106 Whether the use is
commercial seems as if it might be important, as does whether it usurps the
market for or competes with the copyright owner’s exploitation. The other fair
use factors, though, don’t seem apposite.107 Two of the weightiest considerations
in a conventional fair use analysis are whether the use is transformative and how
much of the work is being used. Neither seems to illuminate whether a given
personal use should be lawful. Nor is the nature of the work being used likely to
make a big difference. We care about the nature of a work when we are asking
whether it makes sense to allow someone to make the work available to the public
in either transformed or unchanged form. Where the use is personal, though, it’s
hard to see how the nature of the work would matter. If copyright law is designed
to encourage the creation and dissemination of works of that nature, it should also
welcome their consumption.
Thus, if we analyze my multiple backups of my hard disk, it’s difficult to
conclude that I am making a fair use unless we put a thumb on the scales. The
purpose of the use is duplicative and archival, something that cut against a finding
of fair use in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco.108 Moreover, many of the
files on my hard drive are files I use for projects, like my trademarks casebook,109
that I pursue primarily for commercial gain. The nature of the works that I copy
is mixed, but at least some of the works are of the sort that courts locate at the
core of copyright protection. I have, for example, more than ten gigabytes of
music on my hard drive. All of it got there legitimately in the first instance, but
that doesn’t give me the right to make three different copies of entire songs every
week, nor to transmit one of those copies over the Internet to a remote location.
Some of the files on my hard disk, such as early drafts of student papers and other
people’s scholarship, further, are unpublished works. Other files represent copies
that infringe other people’s copyrights. The amount of these works that I copy is
entire works, and I copy them, in their entirety, many times. Finally, we come to
the effect of my promiscuous copying on the copyright owner’s potential market.
106

17 U.S.C. § 107. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994);
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F. 3d 881 (1994).
107

Indeed, it’s interesting that Sony, the sole Supreme Court case to try to assess personal use
under the fair use rubric, was widely criticized for its analysis of the fair use factors, and
particularly for giving only nominal consideration to factors other than whether the use was
commercial and whether it was likely to harm the copyright owner’s market. See, e.g., Lloyd
Weinreb, Fair’s Fair, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1137, 1153; Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 Cornell. L. Rev. 857, 897-898 (1987); sources cited in Litman, supra note
19, at 350n.11.
108

60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).

109

Jane C. Ginsburg, Jessica Litman, and Mary L. Kevlin, Trademarks and Unfair Competition:
Cases and Materials (3d ed. 2001 & 2006 Supp.).
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There is currently no market for licensing backup copies. Copyright owners’
release of copy-protected copies of their works that permit purchasers to make a
small number of copies, however, suggest that such a market may be beginning to
emerge. If I, and people like me, may make multiple archival copies without a
license, then that nascent market could be damaged.110
Less fancifully, consider my sister’s Tivo. Let’s imagine that she sets it to
copy every first-run episode of ABC’s hit series, Lost, which airs in her
community at a time when she is otherwise occupied. The purpose of her copying
is duplicative rather than transformative. She’s motivated solely by
considerations of convenience. The nature of the work is highly creative, and
subject to copyright’s strongest protection. She’s copying entire programs, and
her copies allow her to avoid paying $1.99 per episode for downloadable copies
through the friendly neighborhood Apple iTunes online music store.111 That last
fact has been enough in some cases to persuade a court to characterize a use as
commercial, since one is getting for free something one would otherwise have to
pay for.112
My sister doesn’t do a lot of business travel, but my mother does. Let’s
imagine that, next year, one of mom’s tech-savvy children buys her a Slingbox113
to hook up to that Tivo she got from my sister. A Slingbox is a small and clever
electronic device that connects to the source of one’s television signal and to
one’s home network. The Slingbox will then allow one to “place shift” one’s
television signal. That is, the Slingbox-equipped are able to watch whatever is
currently playing on their home televisions on remote computers over the
Internet. My mother isn’t much for Lost, but she likes to watch games being
played by her local Pittsburgh sports teams, and she likes to watch them live. She
subscribes to whatever tier of cable service allows her to see all of the Pittsburgh
sporting events. Last winter, she came to visit us in Michigan. As delightful as
she found our company, she was upset to be missing a University of Pittsburgh
basketball game that was going on at the time but not being broadcast nationally.
If she had just stayed home, she could have watched the game. If she had had a
Slingbox, though, she could have visited us and watched the game. Any of her
children could buy one at the local Circuit City and hook it up for her, but would
using it be legal? The Slingbox makes no copies, unless you count RAM copies,

110

Cf. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F. 3d 881 (1994)(finding copying of scientific
articles for researcher unfair in part because it might undermine nascent market for photocopy
licenses).
111

See Apple - iTunes – Videos at URL: <http://www.apple.com/itunes/videos/>.

112

See, e.g., A&M v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (C. D. Cal. 2000) (“Moreover, the fact that
Napster users get for free something they would ordinarily have to buy suggests that they reap
economic advantages from Napster use”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001).
113

See http://www.slingmedia.com.
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but many courts do.114 It also is transmitting a television signal over the Internet,
in what may not be a private (and therefore exempt) performance. If we have to
apply the fair use factors to allow her to view material she has subscribed to and
paid for in my home rather than her own, her chances don’t look too good.
Mom’s purpose is consumptive rather than transformative. The material she’s
copying and transmitting, at least in this instance, is a televised sporting event.
While sportscasts don’t reflect the sort of authorship that we think of as at the
core of copyright, they are among the most valuable broadcasts that copyright
protects. She’s copying and transmitting entire programs, and her doing so
undercuts the market for online and mobile phone products that the copyright
owner targets to viewers like her.115
We could rerun the four-factor fair use analysis on all of the personal uses
I described earlier. The conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that some
personal uses are and should be legal, others aren’t and shouldn’t be, and the rest
occupy a murky middle ground. The statutory fair use test, though, is remarkably
unhelpful in identifying which uses are, or should be, legal.
The inaptness of the fair use factors shouldn’t surprise us. They derive
from an era when copyright covered only the rights to print, reprint, publish and
vend, and most personal uses required no excuse to be lawful.116 When seeking
language in which to codify the fair use privilege, the drafters of the 1976
Copyright Act looked back to Folsom v. Marsh, an 1841 case involving an
allegedly infringing biography of George Washington.117 The application of the
fair use privilege to personal use received almost no attention during the 25 year
process that led to the enactment of the 1976 Act.118 When the topic came up,
witnesses invariably pointed out that reported fair use decisions involved public,
commercial uses.119 Although witnesses disagreed then, as they undoubtedly
would now, as to whether the paucity of judicial decisions on the lawfulness of
personal use derived from the legitimacy of the uses or the litigation costs that

114

See, e.g., MAI v. Peake. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). For a discussion of why reproductions
in RAM should not be deemed “copies” under the copyright statute, see Pamela Samuelson, The
Copyright Grab, Wired, Jan. 1996, at 134; Joseph Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law
and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 1245. 1255-78 (2001).
115

See http://msn.foxsports.com (visited Aug. 25, 2006).

116

See R. Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v Marsh: Distinguishing Between Infringing and
Legitimate Uses, in JANE C. GINSBURG & ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW STORIES 253, 286-88 (forthcoming 2005); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and
Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 975, 997-98 (2002).
117

Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed Cas. 342 (CCD Ma 1841).

118

See Litman, supra note 19, at __.

119

See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell. L. Rev. 857,
883-88, 897-898 (1987).
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might make suits against individuals unappetizing,120 it seems clear that fair use
cases, then as now, have overwhelming concerned uses that were public,
commercial, or both. For that reason, the fair use factors are designed to address
whether and when it is appropriate to make a public and often commercial use
without permission. They were not devised to evaluate the legitimacy of personal
uses.
Fair use is a poor tool for assessing the lawfulness of particular personal
uses for another reason: it is not realistically available to the people who most
need to use it. Fair use in its current form is notoriously fact-specific, requiring a
hideously expensive trial on the merits to determine.121 If a person seeking to
determine whether a given personal use is lawful needs to go to court, each time,
to find out, then the tool is of almost no practical assistance.
To recap, there is a zone of personal use that is uncontroversially noninfringing. That zone includes personal uses that are outside the scope of
copyright law, uses that come within express statutory exemptions and privileges,
and uses that have been found non-infringing by courts. The zone also includes a
bunch of other uses. Conventional analysis dictates that those other uses are
either infringing or fair use under section 107. If personal uses like the ones I’ve
listed can be described as “infringing,” though, they are infringing only in the
most nominal sense. If some copyright owner sued me, my family, my friend or
my neighbor over those uses, the copyright owner would lose. Copyright lawyers
may disagree about on what theory the copyright owner should lose, but not about
the ultimate result.122 If that means that all of the personal uses must be fair use,
though, then that is possible only by construing fair use to cover any use that is
nominally but not enforceably infringing, regardless of its purpose, the work’s
nature, the amount taken and the effect on the market. The minute we insist on
applying fair use responsibly, the situation becomes even more unstable. My
neighbor’s censored read-alouds are perhaps transformative; my hard disk
backups are, on the other hand, profoundly duplicative.
If fair use analysis doesn’t resolve the lawfulness of personal use, then the
conventional story is misleading, at best. It is also, potentially, a dangerous
story, because it invites us to conclude that lawful personal uses that don’t fit the
fair use rubric may be legal, but they shouldn’t be. Rather, we can see them as
unprincipled exceptions that should not be allowed to spread. We are in danger of
obliterating lawful personal use because we’ve been pretending that it isn’t there.

120

See 1965 House Hearings before Subcomm # 3 at 1498-99 (Statement of Ralph H Dwan, on
behalf of 3M); id. at 1514-16 (Statement of Lyle Lodwick, Williams & Wilkins).
121

See Mark Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights in the Internet, 22 Dayton L. Rev.
(1997); Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image, 22 Dayton L. Rev.
587, 611-13 (1997)
122

Cf. Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001).
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VI. A geography of personal use
….I say to you that the VCR is to the American film
producer and the American public as the Boston
strangler is to the woman home alone.
--Jack Valenti, 1982 123

The fair use factors seem like a clumsy and unhelpful test for ascertaining
whether a particular personal use is lawful. If personal use has value in the
copyright system because it facilitates reading, listening, viewing and playing,
moreover, evaluating personal uses under the fair use test is likely to cause us to
miss important distinctions between personal uses we should encourage and
personal uses that we should be eager to prohibit. It also makes it easy to mistake
the degree to which current law permits or prohibits specific activity. Mapping
out the contours of lawful personal use is, thus, useful for two reasons. First, we
will be better able to assess whether the encroachment on personal use is a good
thing or a bad one if we have a more accurate picture of what is legal and illegal
today. Second, any normative proposals on how we ought to treat personal use
will be more effective if they start with a more truthful picture of current law.
If the analysis derived from section 107 is not helpful in assessing the
lawfulness of particular personal uses, can we derive a better test? Our starting
point should be the recognition that copyright law is intended to encourage
reading as well as writing. We can appropriate some useful insights from older
cases that sought to parse the statute to advance both. Those courts focused on
two questions. First, some courts asked, is the allegedly infringing use more akin
to exploiting the copyrighted work or enjoying it? Second, some courts sought to
evaluate the impact of the accused activity on individuals’ opportunities to read,
listen and view as well as on authors and publishers’ incentives to write, compose,
publish and perform. I suggest that when we look at the lawfulness of personal
uses, we need to ask both of those questions. We need to situate particular
personal uses on the continuum between exploitation and enjoyment. We also
need to evaluate both their potential to undermine core copyright incentives and
their potential to enhance essential copyright liberties of reading, viewing,
listening and their kin. Asking these questions may yield a test that echoes the
familiar fair use test, or one that differs in significant respects from the test in
section 107. Since fair use is a poor device for evaluating personal uses, it makes
sense to design a more appropriate tool first, and then ascertain whether fair use
can be tweaked to do a better job or whether we need a completely different test.
123

Home Recording of Copyrighted Works Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794 H.R. 4808,
H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 before The Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and The
Administration Of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) (testimony of
Jack Valenti, MPAA)
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A. The continuum between exploitation and enjoyment
Once upon a time, disseminating works of authorship entailed significant
capital investment, and discerning the difference between publishers and readers,
record labels and listeners was difficult only at the margins, where intermediaries
sought to facilitate the reading or listening experience without a license.124 The
rapid growth of networked digital technology, though, has put cheap mass
dissemination within the reach of individuals.125 At the same time, consumers
have access to software tools that permit them to alter and combine copies of
copyrighted works in ways that until recently were reserved to commercial
businesses.126 Individuals’ new abilities to engage in acts once the exclusive
province of publishers, record labels, film studios, and television broadcasters
have blurred the line between conventional exploitation of works of authorship
and digitally enhanced enjoyment.
If we are grounding the analysis of lawfulness in part on the extent to
which a personal use is best understood as reading, listening, or one of their
cousins, then we need to reflect on what sorts of reading, listening, looking at,
using, running, playing and building copyright seeks to encourage. How broadly
does copyright need its liberties to be drawn? We want people to be able to
interact with texts as well as absorb them. Clapping hands, humming along, or
playing a song on the piano all, technically, create unlicensed derivative works, as
do reading aloud, playacting, and imagining a story’s ending differently. They
are nonetheless lawful by long tradition; they’re precisely the sorts of interaction
with copyrighted works that promote the Progress of Science. Nor does it make
any copyright sense to limit readers, listeners and lookers to the reading and
listening behaviors that were customary in 1790. Just as technology spurs
evolution in the creation and marketing of works of authorship, it causes parallel
evolution in the modes of interaction with those works. We don’t want to restrict
copyright owners to the traditional marketing outlets of bookstore and sheet music
sales. Similarly, it makes no sense to limit readers, listeners, and players to
pianos or analog cassette tapes.
If the distinction between reading, listening and viewing on one hand and
publishing, distributing and broadcasting on the other is more of a continuum, can
we even draw a useful distinction between enjoyment and exploitation? There
will be difficult cases at the margin, but most personal uses, which I defined
earlier as uses made by individuals for themselves, their families, or their close
friends, will fall on the enjoyment side of the line. That, without more, does not
mean that we should presume them to be lawful. It does, however, suggest that
124

See Sony; Teleprompter;

125

See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH O F NETWORKS (2006); Litman, supra note 39.

126

See Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit, Symposium: Cultural Environmentalism @ 10, __ L.
& Contemp. Probs. __ (forthcoming 2006).
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we deem them unlawful only at some cost to the fabric and purposes of copyright
law. We should think carefully about whether the impact of such uses on core
copyright owner incentives is sufficiently substantial to be worth chipping away
at important copyright liberties.

B. The impact of the use on copyright incentives and liberties
In order to evaluate whether particular personal uses should, as a
normative matter, be lawful, it is useful to look at the likely effects of the use on
copyright incentives, and the degree the use is likely to enhance what I have
called historic copyright liberties. Some personal uses will significantly
undermine copyright incentives without enhancing reading, viewing or listening.
Those uses, it seems to me, are uses we should feel comfortable in deeming
infringing. Some uses will pose little threat to copyright incentives while greatly
enhancing copyright liberties, and those uses should almost always be deemed
legal, whether they line up with conventional fair use analysis or not. Personal
uses that neither contribute to the exercise of copyright liberties nor undermine
core copyright incentives are more problematic to classify, but little turns on
whether we get the answer wrong. Uses that both enhance reading, listening,
using, running and playing, and also threaten to significantly undermine copyright
incentives are, and should be, the most difficult uses to resolve, and may require
sensitive and careful balancing. In works and markets for which copyright owner
incentives are abundant, the core purposes of copyright should counsel permitting
uses that advance copyright liberties.
The only doctrinal tool in copyright law for evaluating the plausible
impact of a use on copyright incentives is the fair use test, which is problematic in
this context for all of the reasons I discussed in the last section. Some of the
questions the fair use test addresses are nonetheless useful questions to ask in
connection with the lawfulness of personal uses.
Of the fair use factors, the one that seems most salient in evaluating
personal uses is whether that use is commercial. There seems to be a strong social
consensus in the United States that copyright owners should be able to control the
commercial exploitation of their works.127 The commercial nature of a use seems
to capture something important about the public’s impression of the nature of the
copyright bargain. If a use is intended for commercial gain, it seems reasonable
to share some portion of that gain with the copyright owner; moreover, if a use
involves commercial exploitation of a work, it seems more likely to collide with
the copyright owner’s exploitation. Thus, a commercial use is more likely than a
127

See O FFICE OF TECHNOLOGY A SSESSMENT, COPYRIGHT AND HOME COPYING: TECHNOLOGY
CHALLENGES THE LAW 145-47, 163-65 (1989); The Policy Planning Group, Yankelovich, Skelly
& White, Inc., Public Perceptions of the "Intellectual Property Rights" Issue (1985) (OTA
Contractor Report).
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non-commercial one to interfere with the incentives promised by the copyright
act. Recent analyses of the commercial nature of personal uses, however, have
seen unprincipled expansion of the meaning of the term.128 In A&M v. Napster,
for example, the 9th Circuit held that people who used the Napster file sharing
software made commercial use of copyrighted works because “repeated and
exploitative unauthorized copies of copyrighted works were made to save the
expense of purchasing authorized copies.” 129 In Arista Records v.
MP3Board.com, the court concluded that individuals who used an Internet search
engine to find online sources for music files were making commercial use of the
files they searched for because they “profit[ed] from the exploitation of the
copyrighted work without paying the customary prices." 130 If any use that allows
a person to get for free something she would otherwise need to pay for is a
commercial one, though, then most lawful unlicensed uses would be commercial.
Defining commercial use so broadly makes it useless as a sorting tool. In order to
help us distinguish permissible from impermissible uses, we need to define
commercial use narrowly enough to capture direct financial gain and exclude
more indirect benefit.
What seems to have distracted courts131 in the online context into a violent
expansion of the meaning of commercial is the perception that multiple,
individual noncommercial online uses can combine to make something that seems
commercial in scale and threatens to undermine copyright owners’ opportunities
to exploit their works commercially. In the context of a fair use inquiry, though,
that observation implicates the fourth fair use factor, which asks what effect the
use might have on the effect on the market for the copyrighted work. Using it to
transform noncommercial personal uses into commercial ones under the first fair
use factor and then noting its effect on the market in considering the fourth factor
is double-counting.
Whether a use might compete with uses licensed by the copyright owner is
a factor that has been important to a number of courts in evaluating the lawfulness

128

See Michael Meurer, Too Many Markets or Too Few? Copyright Policy Towards Shared
Works, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903, 952 (2004); John Tehranian, Et Tu Fair Use? The Triumph of
Natural Law Copyright, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 465, 502-03 (2005).
129

A&M v. Napster, 239 F. 3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001). See also A&M v. Napster, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896 (C. D. Cal. 2000) (“Moreover, the fact that Napster users get for free something
they would ordinarily have to buy suggests that they reap economic advantages from Napster
use”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
130

Arista Records v. MP3Board.com, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH)
P28,483 (SDNY 2002) (quoting Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. at 562).
131

Arguably, Congress is guilty of something analogous in connection with criminal copyright
infringement. See No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147 (1995), codified at 17 U.S.C. §
506 and 18 U.S.C. § 2319. See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization
through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws. 54 Am. U. L. Rev.
783 (2005).
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of personal uses.132 That’s appropriate: a use that competes with a copyright
owner’s program of exploitation has the potential to undermine the copyright
owners’ incentives significantly. At the same time, we don’t want to presume that
every time a copyright owner devises a new license, that fact without more
transforms historical lawful uses into unlawful ones. Apple’s iTunes store’s sale
of downloadable Desperate Housewives episodes did not make the users of
videocassette recorders into infringers, nor should it have. We need to give the
analysis of competitive uses more serious attention than simply accepting
assertions that any time a person gets for free something that she might otherwise
buy, she has damaged the copyright owner’s market by displacing a sale. As Glyn
Lunney has pointed out, we’ve assumed the unlawfulness of much personal use
without trial or rigorous analysis, because we’ve been too ready to equate free
goods with displaced sales.133
Unless we assume that the optimum incentive for copyright owners is
boundless, the fact that a use of a work could be monetized if making it without a
license were made illegal shouldn’t without more persuade us that we need to
give the use into copyright owners’ control. On the other hand, where a personal
use competes with commercial uses at the heart of the copyright owner’s
exploitation of its works, the use’s potential to undermine important copyright
incentives should be a cause for concern.
The commercial and potentially competitive nature of specific personal
uses seem relevant to an assessment of the use’s likely effects on copyright
incentives. Neither aspect, though, tells us much about the use’s potential to
enhance copyright liberties. In order to compare the use’s impact on copyright,
we need to look at other considerations.
Some of these considerations are intuitively as appealing as the
commercial or competitive nature of the use. For example, one important
question is whether the specific use is private. The statute expressly exempts
private distributions, performances and displays, but not private copies or
adaptations. The same considerations that have so far discouraged Congress from
making private distributions, performances and displays actionable often
accompany private copies and adaptations. So long as a person’s use is private,
its impact on the copyright owner’s exploitation of her work is likely to be
limited, while its contribution to the person’s reading, listening or viewing may be
significant.

132

See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at __.

133

See Lunney, supra note 28, at __. See also American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60
F.3d 913, 936-39 (1994)(Jacobs, J, dissenting); Sam Hughes, The Piracy Calculator, at URL:
http://qntm.org/owe (“What's your illegal hoard worth? What's the street value of all your pirated
MP3s and movies? How much would the RI/MPAA demand - minimum - if they sued you? Find
out.”).
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In addition, permitting private uses advances important copyright and noncopyright interests. Julie Cohen has written several articles exploring the idea of
“intellectual privacy.”134 Intellectual privacy advances liberty by giving us
freedom to think without surveillance, and is a crucial aspect of any liberty worth
having. The ability to read works without surveillance may, for some works and
some readers, be key to being able to read them at all.135
Another consideration that is intuitively appealing is whether the use is
incidental to some other use, and, if so, whether that primary use is permissible,
either because it is exempt or because it is licensed. Incidental uses occupy the
core of the sort of personal use that copyright law should encourage. If one
purpose of copyright law is to encourage creation and dissemination of works of
authorship, and another goal is to advance reading, listening, viewing and playing
of those works, uses that facilitate authorized reading, listening and viewing have
a very strong claim for copyright’s solicitude. Because incidental uses are
secondary to uses that are either excluded from the copyright owner’s bundle of
rights or already otherwise licensed, they pose little threat of undermining
copyright incentives.
For much of copyright law’s history, it was conventional to treat many
incidental uses as impliedly licensed.136 Music publishers first exploited their
public performance right by licensing public performance with the sale of copies.
The initial justification for what became the jukebox exemption was that the
public performance of music on coin-operated devices was purely promotional,
for the purpose of selling copies of sheet music.137 Radio and later television
broadcasters commonly made temporary copies of licensed material to facilitate
broadcasts, on the assumption that such copies were within the scope of the
license.138
In the digital realm, the results have been different. When MP3.com
purchased and copied CDs to facilitate licensed streaming of the musical works
134

See Julie E. Cohen, DRM & Privacy, ; Julie E. Cohen, Comment: Copyright’s Public-Private
Distinction, 55 Case Western L. Rev. 963 (2005); Cohen supra note 22.
135

Professor Jonathan Cohen suggested that some individual music downloading bears more
resemblance to a 21st century version of humming than to swiping CDs from a music store. Until
recently, if you heard a catchy song somewhere and couldn’t get the tune out of your head, or
wanted to remind yourself of the melody, your best bet was to hum it. Today, many people satisfy
the same impulse by downloading the song in order to hear it again.
136

See David Nimmer, Brains And Other Paraphernalia Of The Digital Age, 10
Harv. J. Law & Tec 1 (1996).
137

See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT L. J. 337 (2002).

138

See Copyright Law Revision Part 6: Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on
the General Revision of the US Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill 44-47(1965). Congress later
incorporated an express ephemeral recording privilege for licensed broadcasters in the 1976
Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 112.
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recorded on them, it was held liable for willful infringement.139 MP3.com argued
that its purchase of a performing rights license carried with it an implied license to
reproduce the works insofar as necessary to perform them. The court disagreed.
MP3.com’s licensors had no authority to grant an implied reproduction license,
and therefore could not have done so:
Performance" and "reproduction" are clearly and
unambiguously separate rights under the Copyright Act
of 1976. Here, the performing rights licenses themselves,
as their name implies, explicitly authorize public
performance only, do not purport to grant a reproduction
right in musical compositions, and, in at least one case,
expressly disclaim such a grant. Moreover, the
performing rights societies themselves do not, and do
not purport to have, the authority to grant such a right.140

More generally, a person licensed to make a licensed use of a copyrighted
work can no longer rely on that license to make other uses that are incidental to or
necessary for the use covered by the license. Since copyrights are infinitely
divisible, and rights are commonly divided and separately controlled, there’s no
reason to think that the licensor of the licensed right has the authority to license
the incidental use, impliedly or otherwise.
The chaos wrought by divisible copyright is impeding licensing of online
content even for businesses well-supplied with copyright lawyers.141 While
courts might once have inferred permission for activity incidental to a licensed
use, they now face the obstacle that the owner of the licensed right may not own
the right to authorize the incidental use. Exacerbating the problem is the
copyright fashion to claim that any digital use of a work necessarily implicates
multiple distinct copyright rights, each of which may be separately owned.142 The
need to secure several licenses for a single use of any given work has stymied
efforts to launch licensed online businesses and driven unlicensed start-ups into
bankruptcy. Negotiations to amend the copyright law to solve this set of
139

See Country Road Music v. MP3.com, 209 F. Supp. 2d 325 (SDNY 2003)

140

Id. at 327-28 (footnotes omitted). Similar considerations seemed to be at work in the
Fortnightly and Sony decisions, discussed earlier. In both cases, the Court emphasized that
defendant merely facilitated consumers’ watching programming that they were entitled to view.
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1968); Sony v. Universal
Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See also Teleprompter v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
141

See generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 Case Western
Reserve L. Rev. 673 (2003); Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellecutla Property of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1 st Sess. (July 12, 2005)
(statement of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
142

See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 37 Hastings Comm/Ent 1 (2004); Loren, supra note
141.
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problems, though, have stalled as competing copyright owners try to ensure they
get the largest slices of pie.143
We can leave them to sort it out among themselves. For the purposes of
personal use, we should avail ourselves of a simplifying solution. Since treating
copyrights as if they were plots of real estate, subject to subdivision and separate
exploitation, has caused the problem, we can look to basic property law for its
way out of the problem. The property law solution to this sort of mess is the
easement by implication. If Abel carves Blackacre up into teeny tiny plots so that
Baker can build a mess of ticky tacky houses, but draws the lines so that half the
houses have no access to the road, the law implies an easement to enable the
purchasers of the remote lots to reach the highway, because road access is a
necessary incident to enjoyment of the land ownership. Without road access, how
could purchasers move into their ticky tacky houses? Copyrights are unitary
before they are divided. If the author or her assignee chooses to convey the
reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, public performance and public
display rights to separate entities, it makes sense to presume that she conveys with
each distinct exclusive right the power to engage in uses incidental to that right,
even if they implicate other exclusive rights.
In particular, we should deem non-infringing any personal uses that are
merely incidental to the exercise of historic copyright liberties to read, listen, or
look at. Thus, even if one concurs with the line of cases that holds that any
appearance of a work in a computer’s random access memory is a fixed and
therefore infringing reproduction,144 RAM copies made in the course of reading
an ebook, watching a DVD, or listening to a CD should not infringe, whether or
not the copies come within an express exemption in sections 107, 117 or 1008.
The lawfulness of personal uses
When we analyze the lawfulness of personal uses, we should pay attention to
the extent to which they advance essential copyright liberties of reading listening,
and viewing, as well as the extent to which they undermine copyright incentives.
I suggest that the degree to which personal uses are commercial, competitive,
private, or incidental to other lawful uses reveals their tendency to do both of
these things.
Analyzing personal use using this rubric is not necessarily going to lead us to
consensus. I suspect, for example, that when Mitch Bainwol explains that the
143

Mary Beth Peters, Register of Copyrights, State of the Union, Future of Music Coalition 5th
Annual Policy Summit, Sept. 12, 2005, podcast online at URL:
<http://www.futureofmusic.org/events/summit05/panel04.cfm>.
144

See MAI Systems v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Storage Tech. Corp. v.
Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, 421 F.3d 1307 (fed Cir 2005); Triad Systems v.
Southeastern Express, 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse
Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999); sources cited supra note 114.
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recording industry has no problem with personal use, he is talking about a narrow
subset of the personal uses that are non-commercial, non-competitive, private and
incidental. I would personally argue in favor of a regime permitting all incidental
personal uses, all private personal uses and, in addition, any personal use that is
both noncommercial and noncompetitive.145 Looking at these considerations
rather than the familiar fair use ones, however, at least enables us to argue about
personal use on the basis of characteristics directly related to its importance in the
copyright system.

VII.

“All rights reserved”
The copyright statutes ought to be reasonably construed with a view to
effecting the purposes intended by Congress. They ought not to be
unduly extended by judicial construction to include privileges not
intended to be conferred, nor so narrowly construed as to deprive those
entitled to their benefit of the rights Congress intended to grant.
-- Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 , 346 (1908)

In Sony v. Universal Studios, Justice Blackmun argued in his memoranda
to the other Justices that the 1976 Copyright Act gave copyright owners the
exclusive right to reproduce their works and that any reproduction not otherwise
permitted by an explicit statutory exemption was therefore infringing. Justice
Blackmun looked at the history of Supreme Court cases interpreting the scope of
copyright narrowly, and argued that Congress had intended, in enacting the 1976
Act, to dissuade courts from constrained readings of copyright rights. There were
no implicit copyright privileges or exemptions, Justice Blackmun argued, which
meant that unauthorized uses that did not fall within an express statutory
provision were unlawful unless they were fair use. Fair use, futher, was a narrow
privilege limited to productive uses; as a general matter, copyright owners should
145

Applying this analysis, I would class peer-to-peer file sharing as non-commercial, competitive,
non-private, and incidental to lawful private performance. On that basis, I would allow it.
Someone who insisted on all factors cutting in the personal user’s direction would prohibit it.
Peer to peer file sharing is in fact a more complex case, since one should probably divide it into
downloading music and what has been called “uploading” music. Downloading music, as well as
being non-commercial and incidental, is also quite plausibly characterized as private, which
strengthens its argument to be deemed lawful. “Uploading” music is not even remotely private,
but it may be non-infringing nonetheless, since it seems to involving neither copying nor
distribution of copies on the “uploader’s” part. Nobody has yet been able to persuade me that the
act of having a copy of a file in a location accessible to the public should be deemed distribution
simply because it can have the same result as distribution. Courts, however, have been more
receptive to the argument. See, e.g., A&M v. Napster, 239 F. 3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). But
see UMG Recordings v. Hummer-Winblad, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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not be forced to subsidize ordinary uses.146 Justice Blackmun lost that argument
and went on to write the dissent in Sony. Copyright scholars, however, have by
and large adopted Justice Blackmun’s analysis of the meaning and structure of the
1976 Act. The statute is so long and so detailed that we deny the existence of
implied privileges or exemptions.147 Any reproduction or adaptation, any public
distribution, performance or display is a prima facie infringement unless it is
covered by a specific exemption or limitation or privileged by fair use.148
That’s not true, of course, unless one believes in a generous and expansive
version of fair use that it would be hard to find in any recent judicial opinions.
We all routinely engage in activity that would be unlawful under such an
understanding. We back up our hard disks; we forward emails to friends. We
read aloud to our children using funny voices for different characters; we play
CDs on our car stereos with our windows open.
What does that matter, given that nobody is likely to file suit over personal
uses? The recent lawsuits against thousands of individuals caught using peer-topeer file trading software might warn against relying too much on the seeming
unthinkability of individual lawsuits over personal use. Assuming, however, that
personal use lawsuits are hugely unlikely, what harm does it do to frame the
statutory interpretation question that way?149
One significant harm that flows from conceptualizing the statute in that
way is that, if it’s inaccurate, it warps our thinking. It encourages copyright
owners to expect too much, and copyright scholars to demand too little. It
snookers judges into reinterpreting the language of the statute to give effect to the
perceived intent of Congress, expanding copies to include RAM copies,150 and
commercial uses to include any use a copyright owner might otherwise charge
for.151 It shortchanges the readers, listeners, viewers, watchers, players and
builders at the heart of the copyright system.
Nothing in the legislative history of the 1976 Act suggests that members
of Congress intended to transform copyright from a grant of limited exclusive
rights into an expansive monopoly over all uses of copyrighted works. As
recently as ten years ago, a suggestion that a literal reading of the statute in light
of recent cases might give copyright owners control over reading, listening and
146

See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 Case Western L. Rev. 917 (2005).

147

See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Oregon L. Rev. 275
(1989).
148

See, e.g., SHELDON HALPERN, D AVID E.
AND MATERIALS 201 (1992)
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149

See Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001).
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See MAI Systems v. Peake Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).

151

See A&M v. Napster.
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other personal uses seemed outlandish. Today, it increasingly seems to be
inevitable, even though the underlying statutory language hasn’t changed. Part of
the blame belongs at our own doors. When scholars insisted that uses are
unlawful unless expressly exempted, lawyers and courts may have believed us;
we may have believed ourselves.
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